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A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE LAV MOBILITY AND 







The U.S. Marine Corps’ Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) is essential to battlefield 
supremacy, and the Marine Corps has no replacement. Because the LAV has reached the 
end of its intended 30 years of service, per PM-LAV, it needs a system upgrade due to a 
service extension to year 2035. A cost benefit analysis was conducted to calculate the 
possible savings of using U.S. Army Stryker replacement parts compared to, 
alternatively, building new vehicles. The Stryker and LAV were both built by General 
Dynamics Land Systems-Canada and have the same basic design, but the Stryker is 
newer and bigger. The analysis suggests the Marine Corps could realize savings of up to 
$200 million, as well as increased LAV capabilities, by using Stryker replacement parts. 
This would free more funds for the Marine Corps to use on other programs and bolster 
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The business of the Marine Corps is to conduct wartime operations in the interests 
of the United States. As an organization that is the tip of the spear in sea-to-land warfare, 
it is imperative that the Marine Corps’ equipment and weapon systems be well 
maintained and up to date. A weapon system that is integral in this process is the Marine 
Corps Light Armored Vehicle (LAV). According to the staff of the Program Manager 
Light Armored Vehicles (PM-LAV), at the inception of this weapon system, the intended 
service life was approximately 20 years (PM-LAV, 2015). They have been in service 
now for 32 years, with a service life extension to year 2035 (PM-LAV, 2015). To extend 
the service life, this platform is going to need additional upgrades and improvements to 
survive the battlefield environments in which the Corps is currently fighting.  
The purpose of this project is to analyze the possible cost savings of using U.S. 
Army Stryker suspensions for the U.S. Marine Corps LAV upgrade program as compared 
to purchasing new components. The analysis compares the initial cost estimate provided 
to us by the staff of PM-LAV in 2015, of $6 million per vehicle (cost of purchasing new 
components for the entire LAV, not just the driveline portion covered in this paper) with 
alternative courses of action available to the Marine Corps via obtainable resources 
(Stryker vehicle parts compatible with the LAV) (PM-LAV, 2015). At the onset, it was 
apparent that there would be cost savings. The primary goal of our research and analysis 
is to produce a precise figure of cost savings as a result of using Stryker suspension 
components.  
According to PM-LAV, the Marine Corps has done research to find which 
upgrades would be best for the LAV, taking into account the needs of the warfighter, 
capabilities necessary on the battlefield and costing options (PM-LAV, 2015). An initial 
cost estimate found the cost to upgrade the LAV fleet would be approximately $6 million 
per LAV (PM-LAV, 2015). With 960 vehicles in inventory, the cost would be over $5.75 
billion. Due to the fiscal constraints of the Department of Defense (DOD) from 
sequestration and the monetary toll of the War on Terror, the Marine Corps has a limited  
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budget available to undertake this project. As a result, cost-saving measures are being 
researched to find ways to decrease the price of this much-needed upgrade. 
According to PM-LAV, the most viable cost-saving method is a joint venture 
between the Army and the Marine Corps (PM-LAV, 2015). During a conversation with 
the staff from the Stryker Program Manager’s office, we were told that the Army Stryker 
fleet is in the process of being upgraded from a standard, flat-bottomed hull to a V-shape 
hull (Stryker, 2015). Due to this change, the Strykers’ suspensions will also need to be 
upgraded to maintain their original key performance parameters (Stryker, 2015). This 
upgrade will remove the original suspensions and install new suspensions. Instead of 
discarding the original Stryker suspensions, the Marine Corps has found a purpose for 
them. Both the Stryker and LAV are manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems-
Canada (GDLS-C) and, as a result, have isolated part compatibility (PM-LAV). The 
Marine Corps will refurbish the compatible parts, which will prevent them from having to 
be purchased new (PM-LAV, 2015). 
An initial concern regarding this program was whether or not the Army would be 
able to supply Strykers as quickly as the Marine Corps needed them for the upgrade. 
According to the Sryker Program Management staff, the Army has already commenced 
their upgrade program and has begun sending parts and vehicles to Marine Corps Depots 
in Albany, Georgia and Barstow, California (Stryker, 2015). The staff at PM-LAV tells 
us that the Marine Corps will start upgrading LAVs in 2017 (at approximately 120 per 
year) (PM-LAV, 2015). By 2017, the Army will have delivered 547 Strykers and will 
continue to deliver them at 120 or more per year until they have upgraded their entire 
fleet (Stryker, 2015). At this point, the Marine Corps will have been given 1,222 Strykers 
for parts refurbishment for the fleet of 960 LAVs. The possible schedule conflict between 
the services will not be an issue due to sufficient quantities being delivered on time. 
In the interest of thoroughness, we wanted to compare the results of similar 
projects done in the DOD. Based on the research done by the subject matter experts at 
PM-LAV, a project of this sort has not been identified and we were therefore unable to 
compare results. There are some similarities in type/model/series refurbishments, but 
none that matched the parameters of our research. Comparing the costs of those projects 
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against the LAV upgrade program is beyond the scope of our research and therefore not 
analyzed.   
Our research analyzed four possible courses of action (COA): brand new, 
refurbished, new and refurbished and all refurbished by General Dynamics Land Systems 
Canada. The information analyzed for each of these COAs were the 17 National Stock 
Number (NSN) components on the Stryker vehicle driveline that were directly 
compatible with the LAV and their associated costs. The costs vary significantly for each 
component depending on the course of action taken. The four options that we used were 
delineated by PM-LAV in Warren, Michigan.   
The first COA (COA 1) is to refurbish all of the 17 NSNs at one of three military 
depots: Anniston Army Depot, Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, and Marine Corps 
Logistics Base Barstow. The implications of this option are that the Army will have a 
sufficient number of parts to refurbish and cover the LAV fleet, and the cost to refurbish 
the components can be calculated and assumed to be uniform, on average, for each 
separate component (the actual procedures for calculating refurbishment costs are 
explained in detail in Chapter III). We found this COA would cost the Marine Corps 
approximately $83,323,008.00–$83,716,934.40 with a 95% confidence. 
COA 2 is to purchase all of the 17 NSNs brand new and have them installed at 
one of the three aforementioned military depots. These prices were calculated using piece 
pricing, for each component, from the Defense Logistics Agency’s Federal Logistics 
(FedLog) website. Since we used the website the government uses to purchase parts, this 
option is straightforward for calculating the costs for the project. We found this COA 
would cost the Marine Corps approximately $336,038,937.60.   
COA 3 is a combination of refurbishing Stryker parts and buying brand new parts. 
The reason for this option is, even with the surplus of Stryker vehicles, a combination of 
needs of the Army for spare Stryker parts and refurbishment dropout rates (the 
percentage of a certain component that will be unable to be refurbished due to damage) 
there was not enough of all 17 NSNs to be refurbished and cover the entire LAV fleet. 
The actual procedures for calculating costs for this option will be explained in detail in 
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chapter three. We found that the only NSNs that did not have a sufficient quantity to 
provide for the entire fleet were the Control Arm Assembly Left and Right with Sensor 
and the Control Arm Assembly Left and Right. In order to compensate for this, we 
calculated brand new piece pricing for those NSNs and used the refurbishment prices we 
calculated in COA 1 for the rest of the NSNs and combined the costs. We found this 
COA would cost the Marine Corps approximately $88,234,698.39–$88,748,531.91 with a 
95% confidence. It is necessary to note that our calculations do not include the extra 
funds paid to the contractors using Navy Working Capital Funds (NWCF). 
COA 4 is to send all of the Stryker vehicles and LAVs to GDLS-C. General 
Dynamics would refurbish all of the Stryker parts. The components they are unable to 
refurbish will be replaced with new parts, and then installed on the LAVs. Since both of 
these vehicles are made by GDLS, they have the means to undertake the entire project. 
According to PM-LAV, General Dynamics calculated and put together a list of prices for 
refurbishment, new components and installation of the Mobility and Obsolescence kits 
(PM-LAV, 2015). With this information, we calculated this option to cost approximately 
$167,927,395.20. 
In conclusion, we found that COA 3 will save the most money and that COA 4 
will be an alternate option. The first COA is not viable because of not having enough of 
all the components to refurbish for all 960 LAVs. The total approximate cost savings for 
using COA 3 will be $247,804,239.21–$247,290,405.69 with a 95% confidence and, the 
total approximate cost savings for using COA 4 will be $168,111,542.40. We also gave 
several recommendations for future projects to help further narrow the cost range of these 
two options. Recommendations include calculating correlations between sub-part failures 
for each of the 17 components that will give a better refurbishment cost estimate. The 
second recommendation is to do a thorough transportation cost analysis to move the 
vehicles and parts to the different locations involved in the COAs. The third is to research 
the NWCF to compare cost information with COAs 3 and 4. These recommendations 
could have profound effects on the course of action the Marine Corps should take. 
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II. HISTORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. FAMILY OF LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLES 
In the late 1970s, the U.S. Marine Corps established a need for an expeditionary 
vehicle (Smith, 2006). They desired a vehicle that was smaller than a tank, rapidly 
deployable, adequately armored and had the capability of mounting a plethora of 
weaponry; thus came the Mobile Protected Weapons System (Smith, 2006). General 
Motors-Canada constructed the first eight-wheeled vehicle variant for testing (General 
Dynamics Land Systems-Canada now builds the LAV) (Smith, 2006). In 1980, the LAV 
was put through an array of tests at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twenty-
nine Palms, California (Smith, 2006). The LAV’s passed all of the tests and Congress 
approved the appropriation for the funding of 700 light armored vehicles to General 
Motors-Canada in September 1982 (Smith, 2006). 
Three years after the contract was awarded, the Marine Corps stood up the 2nd 
LAV Battalion (LAVB) at Camp Lejeune in Jacksonville, North Carolina and a few 
months later began receiving the first production of Light Armored Vehicles (Smith, 
2006). Two additional battalions followed: the 1st LAVB at Camp Pendleton in San 
Diego, California, and the 3rd LAVB at Twenty-nine Palms, California. Within just four 
years of standing up the first battalion, the LAV units took part in their first combat 
engagement in 1989 during Operation Just Cause in Panama. In the years to come, the 
unit nomenclature would change from LAV Battalion to Light Armored Infantry 
Battalion and finally, in 1994, to Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) battalion (Smith, 
2006).  
1. LAR Mission and its Importance 
This section draws extensively from the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
(MCWP) 3-14, Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion 
(Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 2009). As this reference notes, the mission of the LAR 
battalion is to support the Ground Combat Element (GCE) by utilizing their superior 
mobility and firepower to conduct combined arms reconnaissance, security and economy 
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of force operations. The flexibility of LAR to operate as a small tactical unit or part of a 
much larger unit in a combined arms capacity is essential to supporting the GCE scheme 
of maneuver.   
The biggest enemy to any force in battle is called “the fog of war” (MCWP, p. 1-
1). This term refers to the unknown of the battlefield, such as enemy troop movement, 
terrain and weather, and any other variable that makes up that environment. The more 
intelligence, the easier it is for the commander to alleviate this problem and “see” the 
battlefield, and the higher the probability of success; this is where LAR battalions come 
into play. The LAR battalions bring unique abilities to the table for the GCE commander 
with their equipment, weaponry, flexibility and communications capabilities. To clear the 
fog of war, the commander needs to maintain a high degree of situational awareness. To 
aid with this, the LAR Battalions use a combination of personnel and diverse systems 
(HF communications, thermal optics, satellite positioning and communication, advanced 
weaponry, scouts, etc.) to provide intelligence. From this information the commander 
will make decisions that can affect the outcome of the engagement. 
2. LAV Variants 
According to PM-LAV, there are 925 LAVs stationed and/or deployed across the 
globe (PM-LAV, 2015). Seven variants of the LAV accomplish different missions in any 
clime and place. As seen in Table 1, all of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) LAV 




Table 1.   LAV Variants and Descriptions (after PM-LAV, 2015) 
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The capabilities of these vehicles include speed, mission flexibility on the 
battlefield, firepower and utility in offensive and defensive roles. They can move between 
different formations, into and out of troop lines and can even back up main battle tanks 
(MCWP 3-14, 2009). They are air-transportable via fixed-wing aircraft as small as a C-
130, can be lifted by means of an external lift using a CH-53E helicopter and, in the past 
have been para-dropped (MCWP 3-14, 2009). The vehicles also have amphibious 
capabilities, turned fully amphibious in just three minutes, and thus have the ability to 
traverse rivers and other waterways, increasing their flexibility (MCWP 3-14, 2009).  
All the different variants of the LAV have undergone upgrades, as most military 
weapons systems have, from better weaponry, machine parts and armor to completely 
new variants of the LAV in order to take on new roles in the advanced war-fighting 
environment. With the existing and planned upgrades, the Marine Corps expects to 
extend the LAV’s service life to the year 2035.   
B. STRYKER FAMILY 
Currently, PM-Stryker is upgrading their fleet with a different hull that has caused 
a need for new suspensions. The plan to upgrade the USMC fleet of LAVs is to take the 
used suspension components from the Strykers, refurbish them and install them on LAVs. 
“The SBCT infantry battalion’s mission is to close with the enemy by fire and to 
maneuver to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and 
counterattack” (Department of the Army, 2003, p. 1-1).  Figure 1 displays all of the ten 
variants of the Army Stryker. 
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Figure 1.  Army Stryker Variants 
C. MAINTENANCE PROCESSES  
Information in this section covers the maintenance process for military vehicles in 
the USMC as well as the economic analysis tool to calculate costs of future maintenance.  
These processes are important because they provide the foundation for one of our 
recommendations to research NWCF in order to supplement costs for COA 3.  This will 
allow accurate comparison between COA 3 and COA 4. 
1. Inspect Repair Only as Necessary Process 
In learning about the Marine Corps Inspect Repair Only as Necessary (IROAN) 
process, a single literary source was used to gather data: An NPS Thesis, Analysis of the 
costs and benefits of the USMC Light Armored Vehicle Depot (IROAN) Program, 
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written by John Ethan Smith in December of 2006. In the thesis, Smith gives an in depth 
explanation of how the IROAN process is used and for what purpose. 
In short, the IROAN process is a depot level maintenance program. Meaning that 
this is where higher-level maintenance is performed. The IROAN process is also utilized 
when certain parameters are met with regard to vehicle age, mileage or operating hours. 
This process is performed in two locations: Albany, Georgia and Barstow, California. 
When it has been determined that an LAV has met the criteria for its cycle in the 
IROAN program a thorough inspection is done on the vehicle before it is even shipped to 
the nearest depot. This is to ensure the depot mechanics are aware of the vehicle’s 
deficiencies immediately when it arrives. All of the components of the vehicle are then 
removed at the depot in order to inspect the hull for corrosion and fractures. When the 
hull inspection is complete the vehicle is reassembled with repaired components if the 
originals were nonfunctional and it is then inspected and tested by depot personnel. The 
average total time for one vehicle to make it completely through this process is 150 days. 
2. Economic Analysis Tools 
The PM-LAV is required to provide cost estimations to justify vehicle changes 
and upgrades to milestone decision authorities and budgeting offices. The information 
and process described in this section came from Cost and Systems Analysis’ Joint 
Assault Bridge (JAB), Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB), and Wolverine 
Economic Analysis. They were tasked to develop a tool for this purpose. In order to 
achieve the most accurate estimate they take multiple calculable variables into account 
that pertain to the project. Such variables include benefit to investment ratio, operating 
and support cost, net present value, economic life and project life, to name a few. These 
variables adjust for pertinent, or relevant, costs and the benefits of program change to 
allow the Program Manager to discern if the benefits outweigh the costs.  
The economic analysis tool Cost and Systems Analysis came up with not only 
gives a cost benefit analysis of a program but allows for the program to compare different 
variable inputs. With this capability PM-LAV is able to pictorially and graphically 
compare multiple alternatives for the change they want to make for the program. When 
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the calculations are made for the different inputs PM-LAV is able to rank them in order 
depending on the costs and benefits for each. The Program Manager is then responsible 
for presenting the different alternatives to milestone authorities in the acquisitions 
process. Those authorities will use the outcome for each alternative and analyze where 
the project is going, where it is meant to go and what it is supposed to accomplish. This 
will also enable the acquisitions decision authorities to ensure the program achieves the 
end state approved by Congress. 
D. SUSPENSION OVERVIEW 
As mentioned earlier, the Army is currently upgrading their fleet of Stryker 
vehicles and needs to find a method of disposal for the parts no longer necessary. In an 
effort to save money, the Marine Corps has entered a joint venture, with the Army, to 
take ownership of the parts the Army no longer needs and that will be suitable for the 
LAV (Be and Petrusevski, 2015). In Figure 2, the parts that are color coded blue can be 
transplanted onto the LAV without being changed in any way (Be and Petrusevski, 
2015).   
 
Figure 2.  LAV/Stryker Suspension Comparison (from PM-LAV, 2015) 
 12 
There are 17 separate Stryker NSN, components, identified previously. The 
remainder of this paper will discuss the cost savings of using those refurbished Stryker 
NSNs as opposed to buying brand new parts with those same NSN identifiers.    
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Our goal is to determine the total cost savings so that PM-LAV can accurately 
forecast current and future cost savings through program completion. We will calculate 
total cost savings by NSN and FY so that PM-LAV will be able justify their budget and 
the validity of this program. The remainder of this chapter will discuss the four major 
COAs available to PM-LAV and the techniques we will use to find the greatest cost 
savings method. 
A. COURSES OF ACTION 
To determine total cost savings we will use a cost comparison analysis between 
the four different COA’s available to PM-LAV and find the one with the highest cost 
savings. While there are four separate COAs delineated in this paper the third COA only 
applies to six out of the 17 total NSN components due to the high dropout rates of those 
components. Dropout rates will be discussed further in this chapter. 
COA 1 is to refurbish Stryker components that are compatible with the LAV, 
without making changes to them. The refurbishment of these parts will take place at one 
of three military depots: Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), Marine Corps Logistics Base 
(MCLB) Albany and MCLB Barstow. For the purposes of our paper PM-LAV identified 
17 separate NSN components that meet the COA criteria. We will use the research data 
gathered to calculate refurbishment cost per NSN. The refurbishment price will include 
these costs: removal of the component from the Stryker, repair, packaging, shipping and 
storage (before and after refurbishment). An alternative COA, the fourth COA, uses 
GDLS-C to perform all of the refurbishment as well as supplying the new components 
vice using any of the military depots. 
COA 2 is to buy new LAV components from GDLS-C. This method provides us 
with a straightforward means of calculating the cost of each component from GDLS-C to 
manufacture, package and ship to the maintenance depots. COA two will be used if one 
of the following requirements is met: 
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1. The cost of refurbishment for an NSN meets or exceeds the cost of 
purchasing it new from GDLS-C, or 
2. If, after COA 3 analysis, we conclude that it is cheaper to purchase all new 
components versus a combination of refurbished and new components. 
COA 3 is a combination of both of the previous actions. There are six component 
NSNs the Army will not be able to either provide in the quantity needed or dropout rates 
will prevent supplying the quantity required; these NSNs will be identified in Chapter IV. 
For the purposes of our paper we are utilizing piece pricing for new components. Savings 
to be realized from bulk purchases of new components are beyond the scope of our 
research.  
COA 4 is to send all the vehicles, parts and kits to GDLS-C to be refurbished and 
rebuilt and then shipped back to their perspective units.  This option means the Marine 
Corps only has to send the LAVs to a single place to be worked on and can possibly 
simplify shipping.  One issue is that we do not know what price GDLS-C quoted covers 
(i.e. if it is purely refurbishment cost or do they also include profit margin and overhead 
as well).  This matter is covered later in the paper. 
B. DATA SOURCES AND CALCULATIONS 
Subject matter experts (SMEs) from MCLB Albany and Barstow provided the 
data we will use to analyze costs regarding the LAV. The data used to analyze costs 
related to the Stryker is provided by SMEs at ANAD. Also, data relative to the structure 
of the program and partnership between the Army and the Marine Corps comes from the 
Program Management offices of PM-LAV and PM-Stryker, both located in Warren, 
Michigan. 
Using Stryker materials for the upgrade instead of purchasing new components 
will obviously reveal cost savings. Our calculations will include labor hour rates (will be 
dependent upon location), piece pricing for brand new components per the Defense 
Logistics Agency’s Federal Logistics (FEDLOG) pricing and component refurbishment 
pricing (the costs for inventory, packaging and shipping).   
The Marine Corps has a fleet of 960 LAVs needing to be upgraded (PM-LAV, 
2015). The Army is expected to deliver 1,222 Stryker’s to harvest components for the 
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refurbishment process (Stryker, 2015). These numbers provide the Marine Corps with an 
overage of inventory to compensate for component dropout rates. For the purposes of our 
paper we have isolated 17 NSNs for the LAV 3.5 driveline system. Those NSNs are: 
 
Table 2.   Component NSNs (after PM-LAV, 2015) 
In addition to the data for the NSNs, we were also provided labor rates provided 
to us by PM-LAV and Stryker (rates based on extrapolations, company policy forbid us 
from getting exact figures): $110 per hour at ANAD and $89.10/hour at Albany and 
$110.59 per hour at Barstow (PM-LAV and Stryker, 2015). Tooling lists and costs were 
also supplied but those figures were determined to be a sunk cost; with the exception of 
tools given to USMC which are cost savings and will be added at the end. We used the 
information in Figures 3 (the price for each NSN brand new) and 4 (labor hours to 
refurbish each NSN) to aid in our calculations.  
 16 
 
Figure 3.  Cost to Buy NSNs New (after Stryker, 2015) 
 
 
Figure 4.  Refurbishment Times by NSN (after Stryker, 2015) 
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With regard to the refurbished components, there will be some that are declared 
unusable due to severe wear and tear and will therefore contribute to that component’s 
dropout rate (DOR), which will be expressed as a percentage. For example, if a DOR is 
10%, for every 100 pieces of that component, ten of them will not be usable. The DOR 
for each component will vary and some will not have a DOR associated due to the 
percentage being so small it is insignificant. The percentages given in Figure 5 are 
estimations given to us by ANAD (Stryker, 2015) but according to their company 
policies they were unable to tell us exactly how they arrived at those figures. 
  
Figure 5.  DOR by NSN (after Stryker, 2015) 
These rates will come into play when deciding between which COA to use. There 
are several NSN’s that have a high dropout rate that will force those component costs to 
be calculated using the third COA. This is due to there not being enough available 
components to refurbish to cover the entire LAV fleet.   
To calculate a cost for a brand new component the process is to simply cross 
check the FEDLOG for the price to purchase the component from the factory. This price 
will be taken and multiplied by the number needed for each LAV and then multiplied 
once again by the total number needed for the fleet. For example, if we needed to 
purchase brand new flange bearing case assemblies for 450 LAVs we know from the data 
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given in Figure 3 there are 4 required per LAV. The FEDLOG price is $926.00 so the 
formula would be: 
• $926.00 x 4 per LAV x 450 LAVs = $1,666,800.00 
This portion of the calculations is straightforward since we are using a piece pricing 
method for bulk buying of new parts. 
The method we will use to calculate the range of costs for refurbishing 
components is more involved. The first piece of information needed is to find all the 
pieces that can be changed out when one of the main components is being refurbished. 
The next part is to find the cost for each of those smaller individual parts, or sub-parts. 
The third part of this data is to use the history of these parts being refurbished in order to 
establish a percentage of the time each of these sub-parts is changed when refurbishing 
the larger component. It should be obvious that the longer the period of time this process 
is observed the more accurate these percentages will be. For our purposes we used 100% 
or less (meaning will always be changed, normally this is because the part is destroyed 
when the component is disassembled, i.e., an oil seal), 50% or less, 25% or less and 5% 
or less. These percentages represent the amount of time the parts were changed, this is 
important to note because we will also need to use the percentage of the time each part 
was not replaced to find the variance later.   
After we have established the price and the percentage of the times replaced for 
each sub-part we multiply those numbers together to get an Expected Value (EV) for that 
individual sub-part. That means the answer is an average of the cost that sub-part incurs 
over time. Next we find the variance, which is done by subtracting the parts changed 
percentage from 1 to get the percentage of the time the parts are not changed (i.e. 1–25% 
of time part changed = 75% of time part not changed). Now that we have the number of 
each sub-part needed per component, price of that part and percentages for times that part 
is and is not changed we will multiply all four of those numbers together to find the 
variance in the price, over time (i.e., 2 sub-parts x $29.74 sub-part cost x 25% of time 
part is changed x 75% of time part is not changed = $5.58 variance in the cost of this sub-
part over time). This process is done for each sub-part for each of the 17 NSNs. 
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Now we have the EV and variance for all of the sub-parts for each NSN. The next 
step is to calculate the EV, variance and standard deviation for each NSN from the 
previous calculations. To get the Expected Value and variance is simple. We added all 
the EVs and variances from the sub-parts for each individual NSN. From there we 
calculated the standard deviation by taking the square root of the total variance for the 
NSN (so we added up all the sub-part variance numbers and then took the square root). 
From here we had to make some assumptions in order to stay within the scope of our 
research. The first assumption is that the need to replace a sub-part is independent from 
the other sub-parts (not a very strong assumption but to be able to correlate each sub-
parts failure rates and all affected parts for each NSN is a recommendation for a thesis 
topic by itself) and the second assumption is that the failure rate is normally distributed 
(again not a strong assumption but this feeds into the aforementioned recommendation). 
With these assumptions made we were able to use confidence intervals to 
calculate an EV range for each of the 17 NSNs. We did this by using the EV as our mean, 
the standard deviation for the NSN and then calculated a 95% confidence interval to 
show the range of possible Expected Values for each NSN to be refurbished. After we 
calculated the confidence intervals for all 17 NSNs separately we needed to get a cost 
range for the whole project. To do this we simply added all the Expected Values together 
then all the variances together and took the square root to get the standard deviation for 
the whole driveline. Then we followed the same format as described previously for the 
individual NSNs. We used EV as our mean, the standard deviation and calculated a 95% 
confidence interval to find the total estimated range of possible costs for the driveline 
refurbishment with 95% confidence. After calculating the refurbishment price range for 
each component we then have to add the cost for labor hours. Using the hours for 
refurbishment completion in Figure 4 and the three possible labor rates, at Anniston, 
Albany or Barstow, we will arrive at the total possible cost range for each component. 
We averaged the three labor rates together so that we would only have one price range to 
work with. Since the rates are so far apart and the Marine Corps will be sending vehicles 
to all three locations using all three rates would create a much larger price range. We can 
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justify the averaging of the rates because of the large discrepancy between them and 
doing this will provide the more accurate and realistic price range.   
In our research, we are making several more assumptions to perform the 
necessary analysis. These assumptions will allow us to perform the analysis in a timely 
manner without searching for information that was not critical to the research accuracy. 
First, we assumed that there are only 17 NSNs to evaluate. While there are more 
NSNs associated with the Stryker, we are only analyzing the ones compatible with the 
LAV suspension systems without any change. The next assumption is that when a part is 
refurbished, it is as good as new. According to the SMEs at PM-LAV, this is not only an 
assumption but also a fact. When a component is refurbished, it is as good as one newly 
manufactured. Due to the amount of Stryker components available as well as the taking 
the DOR into consideration, we are assuming that 11 of the 17 NSNs will not need to be 
purchased new. The cost for the remaining six NSNs will only be calculated using the 
third and fourth COA’s since they will need to refurbish the parts available and purchase 
the rest new. 
We further assumed to use piece pricing for all components purchased new from 
GDLS-C. This is an assumption based on there being a potential cost savings associated 
with buying in bulk. Should reduced pricing be available, it will simply add to the cost 
savings. Our final major assumption deals with the utilization of GDLS-C as location for 
refurbishing components. It is assumed that GDLS-C has the necessary tooling needed 
for refurbishing Stryker components for installation onto LAVs. This is a significant 
assumption as it justifies reducing all costs for tool purchase to zero. 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
For the purposes of this project, “refurbished” simply means that the part has been 
rebuilt and/or retooled (not a new part) to what is known as Condition Code Bravo. When 
a part is bought brand new it is Condition Code Alpha and the fact the part is brand new 
is the only thing that distinguishes Code Alpha from Code Bravo. During our analysis we 
identified sub-parts that would be replaced to bring the component up to Condition Code 
Bravo. Then we calculated an approximate rate that each sub-part failed and needed to be 
replaced during refurbishment; 100%, 50%, 25% or 5% (see Table 3).  
There are 50 sub-parts for the Differential Gearbox Assembly that can or will be 
changed during the refurbishment process. First, we calculated the Expected Value of the 
price for each sub-part. Then we added all 50 answers together to get the total EV of the 
refurbishment over time. Next we calculated the variance of the price for each sub-part 
and then added those together for a total variance, assuming a Bernoulli distribution. The 
formulas we used were:   
• Quantity per Assembly x (Price x % of the time part replaced) = EV 
• Quantity per Assembly x Price x % of time part replaced x % of time part 
not replaced = Variance 
Then we took the square root of total variance to get the standard deviation. 
Finally, we used a 95% confidence interval to find the cost range for each component 
using the total Expected Value and its standard deviation.   
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Table 3.   Differential Gearbox Assembly (after PM-LAV, 2015) 
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Figure 6.  Differential Gearbox Assembly 95% Confidence Interval 
The price range for the Differential Gearbox Assembly was calculated to be 
$806.99–$892.89 as depicted in Figure 7. The labor rates for Anniston, Albany and 
Barstow are, respectively, $110, $89.10 and $110.59 with a mean of $103.23. Per Figure 
5, in Chapter III, the labor hours to refurbish this component totaled 12.5 hours. Using 
the formula:  
• Mean hourly rate x total labor hours = Labor dollars 
• (Labor dollars + $806.99) to (Labor dollars + $892.89) = $2,097.37–
$2,183.27 
This new price range, with 95% confidence, represents the approximate cost of 
refurbishment per component. One of these components is required per vehicle and the 
USMC has 960 LAVs in their fleet. We determined the fleet cost by finding the product 
of the number of LAVs and the price range:  
• (Number of LAVs x $2,097.37) to (Number of LAVs x $2,183.27) = 
$2,013,470.40–$2,095,934.40  
This data is presented in Table 4 as well as the data for the remaining 
components. We were unable to gather the data required to assign a price range for five 
components: Suspension assembly right and left front, trailing arm assembly right and 
left and the flange bearing case assembly. The prices noted for them are a single price 
calculated from an average of the recent history of those parts being refurbished, the 
actual number of refurbishments is unknown. Another piece that does not have a range is 
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the torsion bar because it is a single, solid piece that only requires labor hours to 
disassemble, clean and inspect and then reassemble. The hydropneumatic strut and 
hydropneumatic element are always refurbished by GDLS-C and cost a standard price to 
refurbish each time. The fleet pricing is then calculated using 960 LAVs (number of 
LAVs in the Marine Corps fleet). This was our process for COA 1. 
Using the information in Table 5, we calculated the costs to buy the parts brand 
new from the Defense Logistics Agency’s FedLog prices. These prices do not include 
labor hours to assemble and install. We used the same labor hours for refurbishment and 
multiplied it by the total LAVs in the Marine Corps fleet and then added that to the cost 
of purchasing all new parts: 
• (Labor Hour Dollars/LAV x Total LAVs) + New Parts Cost = Total Cost 
• ($17,755.56 x 960) + $318,993,600 = $336,038,937.60 
This number represents the total cost of purchasing and installing brand new parts for the 
LAV 3.5 Driveline system for COA 2. 
In Table 6, the dropout rates listed for each NSN are what we used to calculate the 
number of components projected to be available. The numbers in this table are based on 
the Army delivering 1222 Strykers to the Marine Corps and then adjusting for how many 
components are needed per vehicle. Some components have such a low DOR it was 
insignificant but others were very high. The red numbers on Table 6 represent the number 
of that component the Marine Corps will need to buy new in order to have the requisite 
parts for all 960 LAVs. Due to the high dropout rates for the four types of control arm 
assemblies there are an insufficient number to refurbish and accommodate the fleet, 
therefore new components must be bought to supplement the remainder needed. Table 7 
calculates the price for the brand new parts using labor hours, new part cost and number 
of parts needed.   
Since there are not enough components to refurbish for the entire fleet, Table 8 
includes the new part cost calculations with the refurbished parts cost. We adjusted the 
refurbish cost of the control arms to reflect the amount available to be refurbished and 
then calculated the total refurbishment cost. Then we took the cost we calculated for the 
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new parts in Table 7 and added that to both sides of the range to arrive at our new total 
cost for COA 3. 
For COA 4, we used figures given to us by General Dynamics Land Systems-
Canada (Table 9) to calculate the cost of this option. It should be noted that Canada/US 
contract laws stipulate that Canadian companies are not obligated to disclose all separate 
costs within the total quoted cost. This means that we do not know if the prices GDLS-C 
sent us include transportation costs, overhead and labor rates and so on. The only way to 
compare this COA and COA 3 for cost effectiveness is to research the NWFC to see how 
much PM-LAV receives from them to pay overhead rates for the civilian workers at the 
military depots and add that cost to the total for COA 3. Without this comparison it is not 
possible to know which of the options is the best. 
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Table 4.   Refurbishment Cost (COA 1) 
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Table 5.   New Parts Purchase Cost (COA 2) (after PM-LAV, 2015) 
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Table 6.   Dropout Rates (after Stryker, 2015) 







Control Arm Assembly R w/sensor 44 $2,976.00 3.5 $453,096.00 
Control Arm Assembly L w/sensor 44 $2,905.00 3.5 $442,286.25 
Control Arm Assembly R 349 $2,120.00 3.0 $2,219,640.00 
Control Arm Assembly L 349 $2,286.00 3.0 $2,393,442.00 
Total       $5,508,464.25 





Table 8.    Refurbished and New Part Cost (COA 3) 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The priority of the United States Marine Corps is to maintain its edge in combat. 
To do this the need for flexibility and maneuverability on the battlefield is paramount. 
The Light Armored Vehicle gives a field commander the freedom of maneuverability 
needed to lift the fog of war and help ensure victory. To maintain such a needed element 
of a commander’s arsenal this joint venture between the Army and the Marine Corps 
must be a success. However, with the fiscal climate faced by our country and the obvious 
need to cut funding and stay within budget this program defines success not only as 
coming to fruition but doing so with significant cost savings.   
As stated in the beginning of this paper, our research is only a small portion of 
this program but will still be able to realize large savings. This is important to understand 
so that more research can be done to further the cause of cost savings for the LAV to 
complete the mission on time and present the Marine on the battlefield with the best 
equipment possible. It is our hope this work will be the foundation for future research 
into this topic. 
A brief recap of the courses of action we evaluated: 
• COA 1—Refurbishment of all 17 NSN components that can be 
transferred, without being changed, to the LAV. 
• COA 2—Buy all 17 NSN components brand new. 
• COA 3—Combination of buying new and refurbishing parts. 
• COA 4—General Dynamics Land Systems-Canada handles the 
refurbishments of the entire Mobility and Obsolescence kits. 
Each of these COAs has been explained in detail, as have the methods used to 
calculate their costs. Upon completion of our research and calculations we have 
concluded that there are two options to be seriously considered. The first primary option 
is COA 3, to refurbish all of the parts at the depots in Anniston, Albany and Barstow and 
buying necessary new parts. Do to the high DORs for the four types of control arm 
assemblies there will not be sufficient numbers of those components to be refurbished. 
Therefore, COA 1, while offering the most cost savings, it is not a possibility. We found 
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that COA 3 will cost approximately $88,234,698.39–$88,748,531.91, with 95% 
confidence. After subtracting this cost from the total cost to purchase the driveline NSNs, 
$336,038,937.60 (total cost for COA 2), the range of cost savings for this option is 
estimated to be $247,804,239.21–$247,290,405.69. However, these savings do not 
account for the overhead rates paid for the civilian work by the NWCF.   
The second primary option is COA 4, using GDLS-C to refurbish the 
components. We found this COA will cost approximately $167,927,395.20 total. After 
subtracting this cost from the total cost to purchase the driveline NSNs brand new the 
range of cost savings for this course of action is estimated to be between 
$168,111,542.40. This COA saves approximately 50.03% of brand new cost according to 
our research. 
Further cost savings have already been realized regardless of the option being 
chosen because of the specialty tools the Army has already given the Marine Corps. 
These tools would have cost the Marine Corps $753,176.01 if they would have had to be 
purchased. Earlier in the paper we stated that tooling costs were sunk and therefore 
irrelevant. This is the case because regardless of the COA the Marine Corps choses to 
take specialty tools would have to be purchased to maintain the vehicles. These tools 
were given to the Marine Corps instead of being bought, representing money that would 
not have to be spent for this one instance, making this cost savings relevant. This number 
can be added to the total cost savings estimate range to arrive at a total of 
$248,557,415.22–$248,043,581.70 savings for COA 3 and $168,864,718.41 savings for 
COA 4. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on our conclusions, we have several recommendations to further increase 
the precision and accuracy of the cost estimate for the entire project. The first 
recommendation is to perform this same research for all aspects of the LAV that can be 
refurbished using Stryker vehicle parts. This work provides a foundation for further 
research that will give more accurate estimates and truly allow Marine Corps leadership 
to understand the potential for cost savings that can be realized with this project. 
 33 
Another recommendation is a thesis based purely on transportation cost for the 
COAs our research recommended. The reasons for this recommendation are that between 
the two recommended COAs (refurbishing all the Drivelines at GDLS-C or refurbishing 
them at ANAD, Albany and Barstow) is due to the plethora of transportation options, cost 
associated and possible taxes that need to be factored in to establish an accurate 
transportation cost estimate. Having to send all LAVs and Stryker parts to be refurbished 
and reassembled to Canada may have significant cost differences than shipping the same 
parts and vehicles to the military depots in the United States. A large enough difference 
could change the COA the Marine Corps should use. If this assumption is accurate it 
could have a significant impact on the bottom line savings for the Marine Corps. 
The third recommendation is to research the Navy Working Capital Funds to 
figure out how much those funds contribute to pay the overhead for the civilian workers 
at the depots. The reason for this research project is to be able to accurately compare 
COAs 3 and 4 and arrive at a conclusion as to which option is the most monetarily viable 
for the Marine Corps. 
The final recommendation is to do a correlation study for each NSN in this project 
as well as any other NSN that is not on the driveline system but that will be refurbished 
from the Sryker for the LAV, to find out the dependence within sub-parts for failure 
tendencies and percentages. The reason for this recommendation is that this research is 
outside the immediate scope of our own (as it will be for anyone else that does this same 
work for a different section of the LAV) and should be conducted independently on each 
of the NSNs in order to find out correlation between part failures. This will establish a 
more accurate and smaller price range for each NSN refurbishment and the project as a 
whole. This portion of the research will build off of ours and give a more precise cost 
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APPENDIX.  DIFFERENTIAL PARTS USAGE CHARTS 
 
Figure 7.  Data Set for Differential Gearbox Assembly (after PM-LAV, 2015) 
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Figure 10.  Data Set for Rear Suspension Left and Right, Control Arm Assembly 
Left and Right, and Control Arm Assembly with Sensor Left and Right 
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